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THE FISSION AND FUSION OF IS-OUGHT IN
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
S. PRAKASH SINHAt
H OW ARE THE FACTS of the world in which man lives related
to the values or norms he lives by, the norms which are made
imperative in law; are the realms of fact (is) and value (ought)
related in a particular way? Theories of law have sometimes issued
according to the way this question has been perceived by their formula-
tors. The principle that one cannot derive a conclusion which is not
explicitly or enthymematically contained in its premises is basic to
deductive logic. Similarly, there can be no induction from the prop-
erty of one thing to something which is other than the thing itself,1
induction being a process of generalization of the nature of an entire
class from the characteristics ot a number of members of that class.
Within the constraints of these principles of logic, attempts have
been made to reduce ought to is by replacement of ought statements
with is-supportable statements 2 and by derivation of an ought state-
ment from is statements concerning desires and beliefs.' Attempts
have also been made to deduce ought from is through the notions of
the performative aspect of ought,4 the constitutive rules of institutional
t Visiting Professor of Law, Seton Hall University Law Center. B. Com.,
University of Poona, 1956; C.W.A. Calcutta, 1957; LL.B., University of Bombay,
1958; M.S., University of Arizona, 1962; LL.M., University of Illinois, 1964; J.S.D.,
University of Illinois, 1966.
1. For a contrary view, see Brecht, The Myth of Is and Ought, 54 HARv. L.
REv. 811, 812 (1941).
2. Zimmerman, A Note on the "Is-Ought" Barrier, 76 MIND 286 (1967);
Zimmerman, The "Is-Ought": An Unnecessary Dualism, 71 MIND 53 (1962). For
a criticism of Zimmerman's position, see Hanly, Zimmerman's "Is-Is": A Schizo-
phrenic Monism, 73 MIND 443 (1964).
3. Gewirth, Must One Play the Moral Language Game?, 7 Am. PHILOSOPHIcAL
Q. 107 (1970). For criticism of Gewirth's position, see Frondizi, The Axiological
Foundation of the Moral Norm, 50 PERSONALIST 241 (1969).
4. Black, The Gap Between "Is" and "Should," 73 PHILOSOPHICAL REV. 165
(1964). For criticism of Black's position, see Cohen, "Is" and "Should": An Un-
bridged Gap, 74 PHILOSOPHICAL Rzv. 220 (1965); Phillips, The Possibilities of Moral
Advice, 25 ANALYSIS 37 (1964-65).
(839)
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facts,5 the reason for acting,' the ideal observer,' and the underlying
commitment." In legal theory, two opposite perceptions of the is-ought
relationship have emerged: one, the fission of is from ought; the
other, the fusion of is and ought. The pure theory of law proposed by
Hans Kelsen follows the former route.9 The latter approach is taken
by both the purposive theory of law, proposed by Lon Fuller,"0
and by the phenomenological theories of law, proposed by N.A.
Poulantzas," W. Maihofer, 12 and others. This article will seek to
determine whether any of these attempts have succeeded in the fission
or the fusion of is-ought.
5. J. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS 175-98 (1969); Searle, How to Derive "Ought"
front "Is," 73 PHILOSOPHICAL REV. 43 (1964). For a critical look at Searle's theory,
see W. HUDSON, MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 288-89 (1970) ; Cooper, Two Concepts
of Morality, in THE DEFINITION OF MORALITY 72 (G. Wallace & A. Walker eds.
1970) ; Flew, On Not Deriving "Ought" from "Is," 25 ANALYSIS 25 (1964) ; Genova,
Institutional Facts and Brute Value, 81 ETHICS 36 (1970) ; Hare, The Promising
Game, in THE "IS/OUGHT" QUESTION 144 (W. Hudson ed. 1969); Hudson, The
"Is/Ought" Controversy, in THE "IS/OUGHT" QUESTION 168 (W. Hudson ed. 1969);
Ofstad & Bergstrom, A Note on Searle's Derivation of "Ought" from "Is," 8 INQUIRY
309 (1964) ; Stocker, Moral Duties, Institutions, and Natural Facts, 54 THE MONIST
602 (1970); Thomson & Thomson, How Not to Derive "Ought" from "Is," in THE
Is/OUGHT QUESTION (W. Hudson ed. 1969); Wilkins, The "Is"-"Ought" Con-
troversy, 80 ETHICS 160 (1970) ; Zemach, Ought, Is, and A Game Called "Promise,"
21 PHILOSOPHICAL REV. 61 (1971).
6. G. GRICE, THE GROUNDS OF MORAL JUDGMENT 8-35 (1967); Grice, Hume's
Law, 44 ARISTOTLEIAN SOC'Y: SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME 89 (1970). For a criticism
of Grice's position, see Edgley, Hume's Law, 44 ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y: SUPPLEMENTARY
VOLUME 105 (1970).
7. Allen, The Is-Ought Question Reformulated and Answered, 82 ETHICS 181
(1972); Allen, From the "Naturalistic Fallacy" to the Ideal Observer Theory, 30
PHILOSOPHICAL & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH 533 (1970).
8. Frankena, Ought and Is Once More, 2 MAN AND WORLD 515 (1969); cf.
Prior, The Autonomy of Ethics, 38 AUSTRALIAN J. PHILOSOPHY 199 (1960). For a
criticism of Prior's view, see Shorter, Professor Prior on the Autonomy of Ethics, 39
AUSTRALIAN J. PHILOSOPHY 286 (1961).
9. See H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (1945) [hereinafter
cited as KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY].
10. See L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as
FULLER, MORALITY OF LAW]; Fuller, Human Purpose and Natural Law, 53 J.
PHILOSOPHY 697 (1956), reprinted in 3 NATURAL L.F. 68 (1958).
11. N. POULANTZAS, NATURE DE CHOSES ET DROIT (1964) ; Poulantzas, Notes sur
la phtnomnnologie et l'existentialisme juridiques, 8 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU
DROIT 213 (1963).
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I. THE FISSION
The pure theory of law 3 is grounded in Immanual Kant's
epistemology,' 4 which draws a fundamental distinction between man
as part of nature, subject to the laws of causality (mundus sensibilis),
and man as a partly intelligible object which regulates its conduct
by imperatives (mundus intelligibilis). This distinction results in an
essential difference between is (Sein) and ought (Sollen), the ought
being the expression of a necessity or relationship which is not evident
in the realm of nature. Kant maintains that absolute reality as such
(Ding an Sich) is unknowable.' 5 Kant also draws a basic distinction
between form and matter: while sense impressions constitute the
matter of experience, the form is composed of the mental modes of
13. This theory, also known as the normative theory of law, was originally
propounded by Frantisek Weyr and Hans Kelsen.
For a more detailed look at Weyr's theories, see F. WEYR, NORMATIVNI
TEORIE (Normative Theory) (1946); F. WEYR, PRISPEVKYK TEORII NUCENYCH
SVAZKU (On the Theory of State) (1908) ; F. WEYR, TEORI PRAVA (Theory of Law)
(1936); F. WEYR, ZAKLADY FILOSOFIE PRAVNI (Philosophy of Law) (1920); F.
WEYR, ZUM PROBLEME EINES EINHEITLICHEN RECHTSSYSTEMS (The Unitary System
of Law) (1908) ; Weyr, Die Rechtswissenschaft Als Wissenschaft von Unterschieden,
28 ARCHIV FUR RECHTS-UND SOCIAL-PHILOSOPHIE 364 (1935); Weyr, Reine, Recht-
slehre und Verwaltungsrecht, in GESELLSCHAFT, STAAT IJND RECHT: FESTSCHRIFT
GEWIDMET HANS KELSEN zUM 50. GEBURSTAGE 366 (A. Verdross ed. 1931); Weyr,
Natur undNorm, 6 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE LA THEORIE DE DROIT 12 (1932) Weyr,
Rechtsphilosophie und Rechtwissenshaft, 2 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR OFFENTLICHES RECHT
671 (1921).
For more extensive research into Kelsen's theories, see H. KELSEN, ALLGE-
MEINE STAATSLEHRE (1925); H. KELSEN, DER SOZIOLOGISCHE UND DER JURISFISCHE
STAATSBEGRIFF (1928); KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY, supra note 9; H. KELSEN, HAUPT-
PROBLEME DER STAATSRACHTSLEHRE ENTWICKELT AUS DER LEIRE VON RECHTSSATZE
(1911); H. KELSEN, REINE RECHTSLEHRE (1934) [PURE THEORY OF LAW (M. Knight
transl. 1967) ].
The fundamental postulates of this theory may be summarized as follows:
First: a Kantian conception of the world on the basis of the School of
Marburg, with special emphasis on the dualism between "Being" (Sein) and
"Ought to be" (Sollen) contrasted from a formal logical viewpoint.
Second: absolute purity of the juridical method, especially as opposed to
political and axiological influence.
Third: a monistic theory of the Science of Law on the basis of a strict nor-
mative unity.
Fourth: the identity between State and Law.
Fifth: a graded structure (Stufenbau) of the Sources of Law.
Sixth: the primordial grade of international law within the unity of the
juridical order.
De Bustamonte y Montoro, Kelsenism, in INTERPRETATIONS OF MODERN LEGAL
PHILOSOPHIES 43-44 (P. Sayre ed. 1947). See also A. DE BUSTAMONTE Y MONTERO,
TEORIA GENERAL DEL DERECHO 16-19 (2d ed. 1940).
14. See I. KANT, KRITIK DER REINEN VERNUNFT (Critique of Pure Reason)
(1781) [hereinafter cited as KANT]. See also W. EBENSTEIN, THE PURE THEORY OF
LAW 3-42 (1969); Ebenstein, The Pure Theory of Law: Demythologizing Legal
Thought, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 617, 621-23 (1971).
15. KANT, supra note 14.
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the cognitive subject (time and space) and the pure categories of
understanding (quantity, quality, relation, and modality). Formal
categories bring order to the chaos of emotion and sensations. Thus,
through the forms of space and time, emotions become perceptions.
Similarly, through the categories of understanding - substance and
causality, quality and quantity - perceptions become experience,
with the judgments of experience being connected by general princi-
ples. There is a fundamental scission between nature and mind, and,
correspondingly, between the realms of cognition and volition.'
Proceeding from this epistemological distinction between is and
ought, the pure theory of law divides the sciences into causal sciences
and normative sciences.'" The former deal with reality, i.e., the is of
actual events. The latter deal with ideality, i.e., ethical, legal, esthetic,
or other oughts. Law is a normative science, normative here being
employed in the sense of knowing the norm rather than constructing it.
Being normative, law deals not with the actual world of events (is),
but with norms (ought). Having made this formal-logical separation
of the realms of is and ought, the pure theory of law maintains that
the inquiry into the sanction of an ought can lead only to another
ought. Although the content of the is may or may not coincide with
the content of the ought, a contentual coincidence does not affect the
logical division of the two spheres of knowledge.
The pure theory of law claims to be a formal and universal theory,
concerned with essentials of law of any kind, at any time, and under
any conditions. Its purity derives from being pure knowledge in the
Kantian sense, without "empirical admixture," and from being free
of the alien elements of morality and ethics. The pure theory charac-
terizes the legal relation as containing the threat of a sanction from
an authority in response to a certain act. The legal norm constitutes
a relation of condition and sequence: if A is done, B ought to
happen.' A legal system is composed of a heirarchy of normative
propositions, each being derived from its superior. Every legal norm
ultimately derives from a highest basic norm (Grundnorm) which, not
being capable of deduction, must be assumed as an initial hypothesis.
16. Id.
17. See note 13 supra.
18. Kelsen phrases it as follows:
If "coercion" in the sense here defined is an essential element of law, then
the norms which form a legal order must be norms stipulating a coercive act, i.e.,
a sanction. In particular, the general norms must be norms in which a certain
sanction is made dependent upon certain conditions, this dependence being ex-
pressed by the concept of "ought."
KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY, supra note 9, at 45.
[VOL. 21
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A norm is a valid'" legal norm only by virtue of the fact that it has
been created according to a definite rule, with the basic norm of
a legal order being the postulated ultimate rule from which the
legal norms are created or annulled. Law, consequently, is created
or annulled by acts of human beings. Therefore, it is positive and
independent of morality.
Several aspects of the is-ought dichotomy in the pure theory of
law are troublesome.2" First, based upon the methodological dichotomy
between natural (causal) sciences, which operate by the method of
causality, and social (normative) sciences, which employ the volitional
method, this theory posits that law is a normative science, concerned
with ought, rather than a natural science concerned with is. However,
the truth seems to be neither that the method of natural sciences is
purely causal and rigidly deterministic, nor that the method of social
sciences is rigidly volitional. In natural sciences, the choice between
alternative hypotheses is often one of convenience, wherein identical
conclusions may even be derived from different premises. 21 Experi-
ments cannot possibly be made without preconceived ideas; conversely,
each experiment yields generalizations which serve as predictions for
other experiments. For example, in physics, this interaction between
speculative assumptions and experiment is well demonstrated by the
persistent inquiries and continually changing theories concerning the
structure of the atom, the theory of relativity, and the interchangea-
bility of matter and energy.22 Likewise, the method used in the social
19. Validity in this case refers to existence and not efficacy. See KELSEN,
GENERAL THEORY, supra note 9, at 29-44.
20. For a rather unfair criticism of Kelsen in this regard, see S. SHUMAN, LEGAL
POSITIVISM, ITS SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 95-119 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
SHUMAN]. For example, Shuman seemingly reads Kelsen's theory as dismissing
the apparent need to have men believe in some objective values, and he then questions
this proposition. Id. at 100. Also, he interprets Kelsen's statement that "it]he legal
norms enacted by the law creating authorities are prescriptive; the rules of law
formulated by the science of law are descriptive," KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY, supra
note 9, at 45, to mean "that scientific laws prescribe nothing while legal norms
describe nothing." SHUMAN, supra, at 105. After accepting such an obviously over-
broad interpretation of Kelsen's views, Shuman then proceeds to criticize this proposi-
tion as well. Id. at 105-19. In the process, he overlooks Kelsen's own distinction
between legal and ethical norms. Id. at 107.
21. This thesis of Henri Poincar6 has had far-reaching impact upon the philoso-
phy of science. H. POINCARt, SCIENCE AND HYPOTHESIS (1952). See also E. NAGEL,
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE 293-98 (1961); Bridgman, Determinisrm in Modern
Science, in DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF MODERN SCIENCE 43, 57 (S.
Hook ed. 1958).
22. The subatomic phenomenon defies causal explanation altogether, partly due
to the uncertainty formula propounded by Heisenberg. According to this theory, the
relation between the momentum and the position of a given subatomic particle at a
given moment cannot be precisely determined because of the unpredictable variations
in the momentum and position of subatomic particles produced by the interaction of
5
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sciences is not exclusively volitional; instead, an increasing emphasis
is being placed on certainty and measurability. Even in law, the
American realist movement has emphasized fact research and analysis
in the legal decisionmaking process and, in more recent times, be-
havioral research, which employs quantitative techniques in the analy-
sis of factual data, has been put to significant use.23 Therefore, a
closer examination of the methods of science disallows the meth-
odological dichotomy claimed by the pure theory of law.
A second difficulty created by the is-ought dichotomy in the pure
theory of law concerns the descriptive function of this theory. As a
consequence of the dichotomy, the pure theory holds that the rules
of law formulated by the science of law are descriptive, while the
legal norms enacted by the law-creating authorities are prescriptive.24
The pure theory maintains that, as a general theory, its task is not
to describe a particular legal system; it is merely to show how a
particular legal system should be described, i.e., which concepts should
and should not be used in making this description. The resulting
description must take the form of rules (or ought statements) in a
descriptive sense. This conclusion is puzzling because, at this point
of inquiry, the description would not be a set of rules or ought state-
ments, but instead, a set of statements explaining the meaning of
the rules.25 Indeed, it may be a mistaken belief that law, a science
of norms, can be explored using norms as tools, for then law becomes
a science with conclusions of law, not a science with norms or legal
rules as its objects of inquiry." Perhaps Kelsen simply meant that
his purely scientific statements explaining the meaning of a law men-
these particles with the measuring instruments. W. HEISENBERG, THE PHYSICAL
PRINCIPLES OF THE QUANTUm THEORY 3 (C. Eckart & F.C. Hoyt transl. 1930).
23. See, e.g., NoMos VIII, RATIONAL DECISION (C.J. Friedrich ed. 1962); Berns,
Law and Behavioral Science, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 185 (1963); Kort, Simul-
taneous Equations and Boolean Algebra in the Analysis of Judicial Decisions, 28 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROD. 143 (1963); Ulmer, Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Processes:
Some Practical and Theoretical Applications, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 164 (1963).
24. See notes 14 & 15 supra.
25. See Hart, Kelsen Visited, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 709, 712-13 (1963), wherein
he states:
So we would expect the general form of the statements of the normative science
of English or California law if its task is simply that of describing or representing
the law of those systems, to be the kind indicated by the following blank schemata:
Section 2 of the Homicide Act of 1957 which provides . . . means that ....
Section 18, subsection 2 of the California Penal Code means the same as ....
Statements of the form of these two schemata are of course about the rules of
English or California law in the sense that they tell us what these rules mean but
they are not themselves to be identified with the rules whose meaning they
explain. They are jurist's [sic] statements about law, not legislative prounce-
ments of law.
Id. at 713.
26. A. Ross, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 9-10 (1959).
[VOL. 21
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tion certain rules or ought statements as the equivalent in meaning of
that law." This interpretation of Kelsen's theory appears to be overly
generous. Nevertheless, it has been ingeniously argued in Kelsen's
defense' s that the use of words differs from the mention of them,
the latter being descriptive. Thus, although the law-creating authority
within a particular legal system may employ certain words to enact
a law, the formulation of the meaning of the law by the science of
law merely mentions these words in conjunction with other words
which explain the meaning of the law.
A third consequence of the is-ought dichotomy in the pure theory
of law is the division between reality (causal sciences) and ideality
(normative sciences), with law and morality pertaining to the latter.
Positive law is viewed as a system of valid norms; thus, according to the
theory, morality cannot also be a system of valid norms. Conse-
quently, a valid rule of law cannot be contradicted by a valid moral
rule, since
[n]either the jurist nor the moralist asserts that both normative
systems are valid. The jurist ignores morality as a system of valid
norms, just as the moralist ignores positive law as such a sys-
tem. Neither from the one nor from the other point of view do
there exist two duties simultaneously which contradict one an-
other. And there is no third point of view.2 9
This theory describes the collision of moral duty and legal duty in
the mind of an individual as the psychological result of his being
under the influence of two ideas which pull him in different directions,
not the simultaneous validity of two contradictory normsY0 Conse-
quently, the pure theory of law regards this collision as one of
"factuality" rather than "normativity."' This position would seem-
ingly apply both to the case of the individual involved in the conflict
and, mutatis mutandis, to the case of an observer who considers the
law in question to be valid but in conflict with morality. 2 However,
the difficulty with the pure theory's conclusion lies in the fact that
when an individual experiences this conflict he believes not only in
27. Golding, Kelsen and the Concept of "Legal System," 47 ARCHIV FfiR RECHTS-
IJND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 355 (1961).
28. Id.
29. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY, supra note 9, at 374.
30. Id. at 375.
31. Id. at 375-76.
32. Hart criticized Kelsen for dealing only with the situation where the moral
duty and legal duty actually collide within a specific individual, and for ignoring the
possibility of the moral criticism of law where the critic, although under no duty
imposed by the law, nevertheless objects to that law on moral grounds. See Hart,
supra note 25, at 724, 726. This criticism, however; seems to be inapposite since
Kelsen s theory appears to apply in both situations.
1975-1976]
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the existence of the conflict, but also in the impossibility of discharging
both the duties. Thus, the requirements of a valid law conflict with the
requirements of a moral principle. This finding is clearly one of
normativity, not of factuality. Moreover, even if one accepts Kelsen's
claim that neither the jurist nor the moralist asserts the validity of
both normative systems, it does not follow that such assertions of
conflict between law and morality cannot meaningfully be made. s8
In summary, the is-ought dichotomy in the pure theory of law re-
sults in separate, unconnected worlds of nature and validity. This result
is unsatisfactory, for if the purpose of the system of norms is to inter-
pret the social reality by revealing its consonance with the normative
system, then the two systems must have something in common. Only
the synthetic association of reality and validity makes the normative
system a meaningful referent of social reality to the category of
validity.4
Furthermore, the theory itself fails to maintain the purity of its
is-ought dichotomy. Under the pure theory of law, the legal norms
derive their validity from the basic norm,"6 but the validity of the
basic norm is presupposed. If this means that there are basic proce-
dures accepted in a particular society for identifying authoritative
33. Hart, supra note 25, at 725 n.26. Criticizing Kelsen, Hart states that
the statement that a valid legal rule conflicted with a valid moral rule would not
be equivalent to the joint assertion of "A ought to be" and "A ought not to be"
which he considers a contradiction; it would be equivalent to the statement about
"A ought to be" and "A ought not to be" to the effect that they conflict. This
certainly is not a contradiction or logically impossible though Kelsen would be
entitled to argue that it was false.
Id. at 727. The fallacy of this criticism lies in the very equivocation against which
Kelsen warns when he explains that
terms like "norm" and "duty" are equivocal. On the one hand, they have a
significance that can be expressed only by means of an ought-statement (the
primary sense). On the other hand, they also are used to designate a fact which
can be described by an is-statement (the secondary sense), the psychological fact
that an individual has the idea of a norm, that he believes himself to be bound by
a duty (in the primary sense) and that this idea or this belief (norm or duty
in the secondary sense) disposes him to follow a certain line of conduct. It is
possible that the same individual at the same time has the idea of two norms,
that he believes himself bound by two duties which contradict and hence
logically exclude one another ....
KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY, supra note 9, at 375.
34. A. Ross, TOWARDS A REALISTIC JURISPRUDENCE, A CRITICISM OF THE
DUALISM IN LAW 42-44 (1946). Ross also interprets Kelsen as considering morality
as a natural order and law as a normative order, and his criticism of Kelsen is based
upon that proposition. Id. at 46-48. However, it would appear that Kelsen considers
both law and morality as belonging to ideality (not reality) and, therefore, to norma-
tive sciences (not natural sciences).
35. For a searching critique of the basic norm, see H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW 245-47 (1961) [hereinafter cited as HART, CONCEPT OF LAW]; J. STONE, LEGAL
SYSTEM AND LAWYERS' REASONINGS 98-136 (1964); Stone, Mystery and Mystique in
the Basic Norm, 26 MODERN L. REV. 34 (1963). For Kelsen's response to Stone, see
Kelsen, Professor Stone and The Pure Theory of Law, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1128 (1964).
846 [VOL. 21
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rules, 6 then they are not presupposed, but experienced,8 7 and thus
are found in the realm of factuality, not normativity. Moreover, under
this theory, the determination of the valid basic norm is founded upon
its "principle of effectiveness,"8 " the conformity of man's actual
behavior to the legal order. The proof of the minimum of effectiveness
necessary for the legal order obviously requires an inquiry into politi-
cal and social facts; therefore, the proof is a matter of is, not ought.
There are at least six admissions within the theory which infuse
factuality (is) into a structure of normativity (ought) and, conse-
quently, fail to support the claimed dichotomy of is and ought. These
admissions are: 1) the admission that the efficacy of the legal order
taken as a whole is a condition of the validity of individual norms; 2)
the recognition that legal norms may be created by a revolution;
3) the acceptance of the fact that an individual norm may lose its
validity due to inefficacy of the legal order; 4) the assertion that the
basic norm is not an arbitrary creation, since its content is determined
by facts; 5) the view that the basic norm effects the transformation
of power into law; and 6) the suggestion that law is a specific tech-
nique of social organization.3 9 Moreover, the very hierarchy of legal
norms involves ranking various manifestations of legal will, such as
statutory enactments and judicial decisions, and thus implies a cer-
tain evaluation of state activity. This ranking cannot be achieved by
36. An example of such procedures would be rules of recognition along the lines of
Hart's analysis in THE CONCEPT OF LAW. See HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 35.
37. Cf. Hughes, Validity and the Basic Norm, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 695, 699-700
(1971).
38. Kelsen explains:
If we attempt to make explicit the presupposition on which these juristic con-
siderations rest, we find that the norms of the old order are regarded as devoid
of validity because the old constitution and, therefore, the legal norms based on
this constitution, the old legal order as a whole, has lost its efficacy; because the
actual behavior of men does no longer conform to this old legal order .... The
efficacy of the entire legal order is a necessary condition for the validity of every
single norm of the order.
KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY, supra note 9, at 118-19.
39. J. KUNZ, S6BRE A PROBLEMdTICA DA FILOSOPHIA DA DIREITO NOS MEADOS DO
StcuLo XX 24-26 (1952).
40. Cf. Lauterpacht, Kelsen's Pure Science of Law, in MODERN THEORIES OF
LAW 131 (1933).
In addition to the doubts as to the claimed purity of the pure theory of law,
one might also raise doubts as to its claimed universality. The hierarchy of the pure
theory purports to express the pure and universal form of law. In order for that claim
to be valid, no possible legal system could fall outside it; but that is not the case.
As Friedmann says,
[u]nder National Socialism and Facism the will of the leader is the fundamental
norm from which the legal order derives its validity. But below this norm there
is no clear hierarchy between statute, administration, judicial decision, etc. Law
courts are directed to disregard the expressed norm of a statute, if it seems in-
compatible with the political ideals of National Socialism. Administration, judicial
decision and other manifestations of law are all supposed to be inspired by the
9
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separating the realm of facts from the realm of norms. Thus, contrary
to its pretensions, the theory does imply a minimum of rationality
in the structure of law, and the law is bound to include in its structure
certain ontological elements, giving content to the concepts which
formalize it.
41
The pure theory of law does not really succeed in the fission of is
from ought because of its fallacious methodological dichotomy, its
mistaken descriptive task, its unsatisfactory resolution of the conflict
between law and morality, its unrealistic separation of the worlds of
nature and validity, and its failure to apply the is-ought dichotomy
consistently within the structure of its own propositions.
II. THE FUSION
The fusion of is and ought has been attempted by both the
purposive theory of law and the phenomenological theories of law.
Proponents of these theories would argue that the very distinction
between is and ought disappears in a certain type of activity. They
would contend that the two do not represent autonomous spheres of
phenomena but only essential particularities in the structure of the
phenomena.
A. Fusion in the Purposive Theory of Law
It has been argued that in a purposive interpretation of human
behavior the distinction between is and ought disappears, and fact and
value merge.42 A conception of the activity's purpose becomes neces-
sary in order to interpret what is being observed. There are two
aspects to understanding events: the control of events and the predic-
tion of events. The argument is that understanding cannot be
achieved in either of these two aspects without kowledge of the
purpose of the activity being pursued. Value inheres, for example, in
a purely factual prediction that a certain course of action will or will
not be followed, since this prediction is dependent upon knowing
whether that course of action is suitable for its purpose, or, in other
will to realize National Socialism as personified by the leader. In this task they
rival with each other, but are not superior to one another. The very notion of a
fixed formal structure is anathema to this conception of state and society.
W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 286 (5th ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as FRIEDMANN,
LEGAL THEORY].
41. Id.; Liebholz, Les tendances actuelles de la doctrine de droit public en Alle-
mnagne, 1931 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT ET DE SOCIOLOGIQUE JURIDTQUE 209-10.
42. Fuller, Human Purpose and Natural Law, 53 J. PHILOSOPHY 697 (1956),
reprinted in 3 NATURAL L.F. 68 (1958). For an interpretation of Fuller's thesis, see




Villanova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 5 [1976], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol21/iss5/2
Is-Ought IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
words, whether it possesses value when judged in light of the purpose.
This value element is claimed to be intrinsic to the facts of a pur-
posive activity. Thus, the purposive theory does not view a con-
currence of the observation of events, the perception' of the purpose,
and the provisional acceptance of this purpose as creating an illusion
of the merger of fact and value. On the contrary, it holds that the
course of events cannot be understood except through participation
in a process of evaluation.4
This is the epistemology of Lon Fuller's purposive theory of
law which maintains that the legal process is the collaborative articula-
tion of shared purposes. Therefore, law is a purposive activity in
which the merger of fact and value occurs because of the internal
morality of law.44 This inner morality of law consists of eight
principles: 1) its generality; 2) its availability to the party affected
(promulgation); 3) its prospective legal operation (the general pro-
hibition of retroactive laws) ; 4) its intelligibility and clarity; 5) its
avoidance of internal contradictions; 6) its avoidance of impossible
demands; 7) its constancy through time (avoiding frequent changes);
and 8) congruence between official action and declared rule.4 5  This
section of the article will examine whether Fuller's theory succeeds
in fusing the realms of is (fact) and the realms of ought (value).
This examination involves two areas of inquiry: 1) whether the is-
ought distinction disappears in a purposive activity, and 2) whether
the distinction disappears in law when viewed as a purposive activity.
It is doubtful that the is-ought distinction disappears in a pur-
posive activity for several significant reasons. First, the argument
seems to be predicated upon the very distinction it denies. In order
to judge whether an activity possesses the value attributed to it,
it is necessary to know to what the value is being attributed. This
value ascription made upon something otherwise valueless is possible
only after identifying that thing in nonevaluative terms. Thus, the
distinction remains between the value (ought) and the fact (is) to
which the value is being attributed. Second, the interpretation of
purposive behavior necessitates an inquiry into whether specific acts
43. Fuller, supra note 42.
44. FULLER, MORALITY OF LAW, supra note 10; cf. R. vON JHERING, LAW AS A
MEANS TO AN END (I. Husik transl. 1913).
45. FULLER, MORALITY OF LAW, supra note 10, at 39. It would be tempting to
compare Fuller's internal morality of law with the minimum requirements of a legal
system set forth in Kelsen's concept of the minimum of effectiveness, KELSEN, GENERAL
THEORY, supra note 9, at 119, Hart's concept of natural necessity, Hart, Positivism
and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REv. 593, 621-24 (1958), or Ross'
concept of inner coherence of meaning, A. Ross, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 32, 34 (1958).
However, such a comparison is outside the scope of this article.
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achieve certain goals. In so examining, value judgments necessarily
occur in addition to those which are intrinsic to the behavior in
question. Not only are such judgments initially made on the basis of
values, but furthermore, these values are not limited by those claimed
to be intrinsic to the facts of the particular behavior.
Third, the fact that some behavior is purposive in nature im-
plies only that the actor has the purpose, not that he ought to have
it. In other words, both are is statements. Ought is not merged with
is merely because the purpose in fact exists. Moreover, when law is
represented as a purposive activity under this theory, the meaning of
"purpose" is not clear. It may mean, for example, something of which
one must be conscious, the forces determining one's conduct, inten-
tional acts, the pursual of a specific end, the determinant of the
means-end relationship, proximate or ulterior consideration, or some-
thing to be discerned from observable behavior alone.46 Whatever mean-
ing is ascribed, it does not follow from the fact of purpose that the pur-
pose is an ought. A purpose may be as it is or as it ought to be. Although
the theory claims that is and ought merge when the activity is purposive,
even assuming the claimed merging of purpose and action, it does not
follow that ought and is have thereby merged. Additionally, the theory
seems to confuse the judgments about the purpose of an activity with
judgments about its morality; the two are not the same. Hart uses the
example of poisoning as a purposive activity which, in light of its
purpose, has its own internal principles, such as the avoidance of
poisons which cause the victim to vomit, and the avoidance of poisons
whose shape, color, or size is likely to attract notice.47 Such princi-
ples of the poisoner's art cannot be called the morality of poisoning,
for that characterization would fail to distinguish the efficiency of an
activity from its morality.
Another criticism of this theory is that the knowledge of the actor's
purpose, while assisting the observer in organizing the observational
data in a certain manner, reveals nothing about the moral quality of
that purpose. The knowledge of the actor's purpose may disclose his
dispositional characteristics, 4 his permanent possibilities of perform-
46. D. EMMET, FUNCTION, PURPOSE AND POWERS 111 (1958); Laird, It All
Depends Upon the Purpose, 1 ANALYSIS 49 (1934); Nakhnikian, Professor Fuller
on Legal Rules and Purposes, 2 WAYNE L. REV. 190, 197 (1956); Sparshot, The
Concept of Purpose, 72 ETHICS 157 (1962) ; Taylor, Purposeful and Non-Purposeful
Behavior: A Rejoinder, 17 PHILOSOPHY OF Sci. 327 (1950).
47. Hart, Book Review, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1286 (1965).
48. G. RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 43 (1949).
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ance,49 or even purposive criteria for evaluating his actions.5" It does
not, however, reveal the oughtness of his purpose. No value is derived
from the mere fact. Finally, while it is true that the adequacy of a
description can be judged only with reference to the purpose for which
the descriptive account is made,5' the account itself does not therefore
become intrinsically evaluative.5 2 What is evaluative here is not the
account itself, but the judgment on the adequacy of the account
rendered. The totality of these reasons leads to the conclusion that
a purposive analysis of human behavior fails to demonstrate that is
and ought are conceptually indistinct.
Secondly, does the is-ought distinction disappear in law when
viewed as a purposive activity? This claim is based upon the assertion
that the eight principles of Fuller's purposive theory5 constitute an
intrinsic, internal morality of law. This claim is difficult to accept
since these eight principles appear to be no more than the minimum
components of an efficiently functioning modern legal system. Further-
more, the formula seems to omit other conditions which may very
well be considered as additional minimum requirements. For example,
such conditions may include establishing authoritative law-making
procedures at the outset, complying with these procedures, providing
institutions for the authoritative interpretation of law, and providing
for the execution of a law by public official or private citizen.5 4 In
any case, to assert that this formula of efficacy 5  is a statement of
moral principles in any substantial sense of the term "morality"
49. Spilsbury, Dispositions and Phenomenalism, 62 MIND 339 (1953).
50. Nakhnikian, supra note 46.
51. Nagel observes:
[W]hen the physicist offers a non-evaluative account of a given system of pulleys
(i.e., when he assumes a "descriptive posture" toward his subject matter), if his
aim is simply to discover what is the mechanical advantage of the system, his
account is not inadequate because he fails to note the weight of the pulleys, the
length and tensile strength of the cord, or the purchase price of the machine. On
the other hand, a builder assessing the physical and economic suitability of the
pulley system for lifting construction materials used in his business, would be
giving an inadequate account were he to ignore these items.
Nagel, Fact, Value, and Human Purpose, 4 NATURAL L.F. 26, 28 (1959).
52. SHUMAN, supra note 14, at 75-83; Cohen, Law, Morality, and Purpose, 10
VILL. L. REv. 640 (1965); Nagel, supra note 51; Nagel, On the Fusion of Fact and
Value: A Reply to Professor Fuller, 3 NATURAL L.F. 77 (1958). See also Lewis,
An Anaylsis of "Purposive Activity": Its Relevance to the Relation Between Law
and Moral Obligation, 16 AM. J. JURISPRUDENCE 143 (1971).
53. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
54. See Summers, Professor Fuller on Morality and Law, 18 J. LEGAL ED. 1,
19-21 (1965).
55. The formula of efficacy could be compared to Kelsen's minimum of effective-
ness, Hart's natural necessity, or Ross' inner coherence of meaning. See note 45 supra.
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appears to claim too much. Although infringement of any of these
eight requirements may result in a less effective legal system, this
consequence is hardly sufficient to arouse a sense of moral culpability.
On the other hand, violations of moral principles may occur from a
law-making which may have fulfilled all of these requirements. Thus,
the issue of morality remains untouched by these eight principles. 5
Due to this very fact, one could say that these requirements apply to
any legal system regardless of its ideology. 7 Moreover, a mere viola-
tion of any of these requirements does not, in itself, result in official
wrongdoing; rather, such wrongdoing arises from the unjust conse-
quences resulting from the official's action. Therefore, these eight
requirements do not provide the standard for determining immorality.
Fuller nevertheless defends the moral claim for the eight princi-
ples on a variety of grounds:
1. Only through these principles can substantially moral laws
be achieved.5 8 However, while law is admittedly a precondition to
good law, it is also clear that the adoption of these eight principles
can result in immoral as well as moral laws.
2. The requirements of generality, publicity, and congruent ad-
ministration tend to assure morally good laws. 9 While this may
indeed be the tendency, morally good laws do not necessarily follow
from these requirements. Also, the fact that these requirements may
tend to achieve moral laws in no way proves that the requirements
themselves are moral.
3. The requirement of clarity is a moral principle, since some
evil purposes cannot be clearly articulated in laws.6" This proposi-
tion, too, is difficult to accept, since some good purposes are as
56. See also Cohen, Law, Morality and Purpose, 10 VILL. L. REv. 640 (1964) ;
Dworkin, Philosophy, Morality, and Law - Observations Prompted by Professor
Fuller's Novel Claim, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 668 (1965); Dworkin, The Elusive Morality
of Law, 10 VILL. L. REv. 631 (1965); Summers, supra note 54, at 24-26.
57. Friedmann states:
Even the one requirement that might be thought of as expressing a particular -
liberal - philosophy, i.e., the general - though not absolute prohibition of retro-
activity is essential to the functioning of any legal system. No totalitarian legal
order could survive for any length of time if all or a great majority of its laws
were made retroactive; legal order would break down in confusion. On the other
hand, as Fuller himself says, democratic legal systems may sometimes have to
admit retrospective legislation.
FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY, supra note 40, at 18-19.
58. FULLER, MORALITY OF LAW, supra note 10, at 155.
59. Id. at 157-59.
60. Id. at 159-62.
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difficult to articulate as some evil ones. Conversely, some morally
repugnant laws are as clearly articulated as some morally laudable
ones. Moreover, a law concerning a matter upon which there is
general moral agreement in society makes no great demands for clear
and precise articulation.
4. The internal morality claimed by the purposive theory is
moral because it impliedly views man as a responsible agent."1 How-
ever, one need not conclude that, because a proposition implies a view
of man as responsible, the implication itself is moral. Second, by
adopting these eight requirements, one may become responsible for the
efficacy of the law but not for its morality. Third, the fact that a man
is responsible does not ensure that he is thereby morally good in any
substantive sense.
5. Because these eight requirements are principles of institu-
tional or political morality, or the morality of the officials acting in
that capacity, they nonetheless constitute morality.12 No one questions
that the political morality or the morality of official conduct is properly
called morality; rather, the issue is whether these eight requirements
are determinative of the moral character of the official act. Clearly,
for reasons mentioned above, the moral question remains untouched
by these requirements. Nothing morally commendable follows from ad-
herence to these principles; nothing morally reprehensible follows from
nonadherence to them. It is possible to inflict a moral wrong by laws
which are general, prospective, and clear, just as it is possible to
correct a moral abuse by a retroactive law, the moral character of
which will not be determined by the mere fact of its retroactivity.
6. Violation of any of these requirements undermines the in-
tegrity of the law itself.63 If "the integrity of the law itself" means
being efficacious as a result of being a) general, b) promulgated,
c) prospective, d) intelligible and clear, e) uncontradictory, f) not
impossible in the demands it makes, g) constant through time, and
h) congruent of official action and declared rule, then the point is
well taken. However, this concept of integrity of the law cannot
determine whether that law itself is moral.
In an attempt to defend the claim of morality for the above eight
principles, it has been argued: 1) the requirement of consistency is a
61. Id. at 162-67.
62. Fuller, A Reply to Professors Cohen and Dworkin, 10 VILL. L. REv. 655,
656-59 (1965).
63. Id. at 660. Some of these points which support the claim of morality are
pursued further in FULLER, MORALITY OF LAW, supra note 10, at 200-23.
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moral condition since it would be morally unsatisfactory to impose
sanctions where it is impossible to comply with inconsistent directives;
2) the requirement of not making impossible demands is a moral
condition since it reflects the Kantian principle that ought implies can;
and 3) the requirements of promulgation, understandability, and
prospectiveness are moral conditions since it would be morally unsatis-
factory to be punished for directives of which one is unaware, or which
cannot be understood, or which are not prospective.64 The totality of
the principles constitute the intrinsic morality of law. Since the appli-
cation of these principles can achieve a morally perverse law, it can
be said, consistent with the purposive theory, that although a morally
bad law has been achieved, the morality of law, nevertheless, remains
intact because the eight conditions have been fulfilled. This is a very
curious position. Fuller and Mullock may respond by noting that this
criticism relates to the substance of law, a matter of extrinsic morality,
while they are concerned with the form of law, a matter of intrinsic
morality. This response brings to focus my point that the morality
of law cannot be apprehended by the distinctions proposed by this
theory. It cannot be apprehended by including things claimed by this
theory to be intrinsic while excluding things claimed to be extrinsic.
This "inner morality of law," represented by Fuller's principles, fails
to account fully for the morality of law, because a moral accounting
of law must do more than limit itself to matters of form. It must take
recourse to that which is of substance, to that which is external to its
form. Therefore, the realm of fact (is) and the realm of value (ought.)
do remain distinct realms even in law. While one may speculate as
to the relationship between the two realms, it cannot be said that the
fact and value (is and ought) merge in law in the sense claimed by
Fuller's purposive theory. The purposive theory sets forth the condi-
tions deemed necessary and sufficient for the existence of a legal system,
comparable to those conditions proposed by Kelsen, Hart, or Ross,
but the theory by no means establishes a logically necessary connection
between moral principles and law. The connection which it establishes
may be necessary practically, but not logically.65 In conclusion, it can-
not be said that the purposive theory of law has proved that the dis-
tinction between is and ought does not exist.
64. Mullock, The Inner Morality of Law, 84 ETHICS 327, 329 (1974).
65. This distinction may be similar to that made by Plato and Aristotle between
the theoretical (causal, logical) and the practical. See generally ARISTOTLE, ETHICA
NICHOMACHEA; PLATO, STATESMAN. For an attempt to defend Fuller's theory along
these lines, see Mullock, supra note 64, at 327-28.
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B. Fusion in the Phenomenological Theories of Law
Phenomenology66 indicates two things: 1) a particular method of
observation outlined by Edmund Husserl ;67 and 2) the development
of certain doctrinal themes, or the drawing of ontological, metaphysical,
and anthropological consequences, by different phenomenologists, in-
cluding Husserl68 Phenomenology appears in a variety of ways. It
may appear as an objective inquiry into the logic of essences and
meanings, as a theory of abstraction, as a psychological description of
consciousness, as a speculation on the transcendental ego, as a method
for approaching concretely lived existence, or as existentialism itself. 9
Several kinds of phenomenology are evident in the work of Husserl
himself.7 0 However, the conceptual unity of this philosophical move-
ment results from its method. 71 This method consists of a series of
66. Johann Heinrich Lambert first spoke of phenomenology in his Neuess
Organon, referring to it as the theory of illusion. J.H. LAMBERT, NEUESS ORGANON
(1764). Immanuel Kant, Lambert's contemporary, termed "phenomena" those objects
and events as they appear in our experience. He distinguished them from "noumena,"
which are objects and events as they are in themselves - beyond the forms imposed
upon them by our cognitive faculties. Kant argued that man can know only "phe-
nomena," not "noumena." See KANT, supra note 14. This theory was disputed by
Georg Wilhem Friedrich Hegel. G. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SPIRIT (1807).
In the middle of the 19th century, phenomenology denoted a purely descriptive study
of any given subject matter. See W. HAMILTON, LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS (1858) ;
E. VON HARTMANN, PHENOMENOLOGY OF MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS (1878). At the turn
of the century, C.S. Peirce extended phenomenology beyond a descriptive study of
all that is observed to be real, to include whatever is before the mind - real, illusory,
imaginary, or dreamy. Edmund Husserl, the father of modern phenomenology, used
the term in the early years of this century to denote a manner of approaching
philosophy. See note 67 and accompanying text infra. Thus, in the modern parlance
of philosophy, phenomenology became a philosophical method.
67. E. HUSSERL, CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PHENOMEN-
OLOGY (1960) ; E. HUSSERL, IDEAS: GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PURE PHENOMENOLOGY
(1931); E. HUSSERL, IDEEN ZU EINER REINEN PHANOMENOLOGIE UND PHANOMENO-
LOGISCHEN PHILOSOPHIE, VOL. II PHANOMENOLOGISCHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN ZUR KON-
STITUTION (M. Biemel ed. 1952) ; E. HUSSERL, IDEEN ZU EINER REINEN PHANOMENO-
LOGIE UND PHAINOMENOLOGISCHEN PHILOSOPHIE, VOL. III DIE PHANOMENOLOGIE UND
DIE FUNDAMENTS DER WISSENSCHAFTEN (M. Biemel ed. 1952); E. HUSSERL, THE
CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY (1970); E.
HUSSERL, THE IDEA OF PHENOMENOLOGY (1964); E. HUSSERL, THE PARIS LECTURES
(1964) ; HUSSERL, Phenomenology, in ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITIANICA (14th ed. 1927) (new
translation by R. Palmer in 2 J. BRITISH SOC'Y FOR PHENOMENOLOGY 77 (1971)).
68. P. AMSELEK, METHODE PHANOMPNOLOGIQUE ET THtORIE DU DROIT 86 (1964);
E. BR6HIER, HISTOIRE DE LA PHILOSOPHIE ALLEMANDE 182 (3d ed. 1954); H. Pos,
PROBLkMES ACTUELS DE LA PHfENOMkNOLOGIE: ACTES DU COLLOQUE INTERNATIONAL
DE PHPNOMPNOLOGIE 31 (1951).
69. For a survey of the phenomenology of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and
Merleau-Ponty, see P. THPVENAZ, WHAT IS PHENOMENOLOGY? AND OTHER ESSAYS
37-92 (1962).
70. See 1 H. SPIEGELBERG, THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOVEMENT: A HISTORICAL
INTRODUCTION 74-75 (1960) [hereinafter cited as SPIEGELBERG].
71. R. CALLOIS, PANORAMA DES ID-ES CONTEMPORAINES 55 (1951). See also
Natanson, Phenomenology and the Social Sciences, in 1 PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 23-24 (M. Natanson ed. 1973) ; Amselek, La Phdnominologie et la
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three reductions: 1) philosophical reduction, achieved by bypassing
all theories and explanatory concepts about things, thereby returning
to the things themselves; 2) eidetic reduction, achieved by eliminating
the factual elements of the objects under investigation so as to per-
ceive their essence (eidos), through discerning their typical struc-
tures ;7" and 3) transcendental reduction, achieved by eliminating other
objects of consciousness to disclose the thing's consciousness, or in-
tentionality, thereby enabling the consciousness to perceive itself in
pure transcendental ego. According to one observer,7" the steps of the
phenomenological method are: 1) investigating particular phenomena;
2) investigating general essences; 3) apprehending essential relation-
ships among essences; 4) watching modes of appearance; 5) watching
the constitution of phenomena in consciousness; 6) suspending belief
in the existence of the phenomena; and 7) interpreting the meaning of
phenomena.
Various attempts have been made to apply the phenomenological
method to the description of law, resulting in several phenomenological
theories of law.74 The major elements of these theories include:
1. The bridging of the antinomy between fact and value, by
demonstrating that values are objective realities, immanent in the
appreciation of the world of facts.
droit, 17 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 185, 188 (1972), translated as The
Phenomenological Description of Law, in 2 PHENOMENOLOGY 367 (M. Natanson
ed. 1973).
72. Husserl explains:
If one keeps no matter what object fixed in its form or category and maintains
continuous evidence of its identity throughout the change in modes of con-
sciousness of it, one sees that, no matter how fluid these may be, and no matter
how inapprehensible as having ultimate elements, still they are by no means
variable without restriction. They are always restricted to a set of structural
types, which is "invariable," inviolabily the same as long as the objectivity
remains intended as this one and as of this kind, and as long as, throughout the
change in modes of consciousness, evidence of objective identity can persist.
E. HUSSERL, CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PHENOMENOLOGY 51
(1960).
73. SPIEGELBERG, supra note 70, at 659.
74. For a survey of these theories, see Friedmann, Phenomenology and Legal
Science, in 2 PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 343, 346-459 (M. Natanson
ed. 1973). Friedmann classifies these theories using three approaches:
(a) the deduction, from the essence (Wesenheit) of legal concepts and institu-
tions, of certain structural qualities, believed by the proponents of this approach
to be a priori, immanent, and therefore immutable; (b) a somewhat related,
but more elastic, approach to the legal order, whose key concept is the Natur
der Sache (nature des choses, "nature of the thing") ; and (c) an essentially
Latin American trend in contemporary legal philosophy, which is derived from
the phenomenological value philosophies (Wertphilosophie) of two German
thinkers, Max Scheler and Nicholai Hartmann.
Id. at 347. Amselek classifies these theories into a) axiological and b) existential
phenomenology. Amselek, La Phinomnologie et le droit, 17 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSO-
PHIE DU DROIT 185 (1972), translated as the Phenomenological Description of Law,
in 2 PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 367, 377-80 (1973).
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2. The application of the phenomenological concepts of Wesen-
heit and Wesensschau to the world of law, leading to the dis-
tillation of essential and "immanent" properties of legal concepts
and institutions.
3. The dynamic use of the fusion of fact and value, particularly
in the concept of the Natur der Sache, for a theory of social change
and human progress, i.e., as a way to attain certain ideals of law.75
The several theories assert these elements in different combinations
and with varying emphasis.
The phenomenological assertion with respect to is-ought (fact-
values) is that facts constitute legal values per se; thus the theory
claims a fusion of fact and value. Human existence, by its very
ontological structure, is deemed a value, such that man cannot exist or
act without values; therefore, these values are created because man
must exist. The process of comprehension of juridical values must
be perceived through the practical activity of man at a given place and
moment of history. Values are thus objectively realized in the factual
activity of man.76 Ought does not represent an autonomous sphere of
phenomena, but only an essential particularity of the structure of cer-
tain phenomena, such as law, which express a thing to be realized."
Instead of a dualism between fact and value, there is an immanent
sense of the real, the totality of which is comprised of both fact and
value.7 8 In law, the identification of fact and value is exhibited by the
existence of certain factual relationships which have "immanent" legal
value. For example, the courts have been able to attribute legal con-
sequences to certain relationships which fall outside the forms pre-
scribed by the relevant statutes, thereby demonstrating a direct and
immediate transposition of the practical situation into the juridical
universe.79
There are three major problems with this argument. First, it
is difficult to accept this surfacing of the immanent as either a fusion
of fact and value or as the abolition of the distinction. This may be
one explanation of the interrelationship of law and social change, but
there are others. An axiological process may even be demonstrated;
75. Friedmann, supra note 74, at 359.
76. N. POULANTZAS, NATURE DES CHOSES ET DROIT 82-103, 290, 292 (1964);
Poulantzas, Notes sur la phbnominologie et l'existentialisme juridiques, 8 ARCHIVES
DE PHILOSOPHIE Du DROIT 213, 229-30 (1963) ; Poulantzas, Response a M. Kalinowski,
8 ARCHIVES BE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 271, 271-72 (1963).
77. Peschka, A Sein is Sollen problimcija a modern jogomdlethen, 11 ALLAM-P-S
JOSTUDOMANY 400 (1908); Peschka, La Phenomenologisme dans la philosophie du
droit moderne, 12 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 259 (1967); Peschka, Sein
und Sollen in modernen Rechtsphilosophie, 11 ACTA JURIDICA ACADEMIAE SCIEN-
TIARUM HUNGARICAE 3 (1969).
78. N. POULANTZAS, NATURE DES CHOSES ET DROIT 8-9 (1964).
79. Id. at 292.
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however, the mere adjustment of legal values to new social facts does
not indicate fusion of the two.80
Second, if fact and value merge in the nature of things, certain
inevitable values would surface, leaving an axiological fatalism. This
merging would eliminate the question of choice between different
values or ideologies, and discard the conflict between them as non-
existent. This is clearly not the case. The very issue of morality, the
very genesis of moral decisions, is predicated upon the existence of
these choices. If one did not have these choices, there would be no
need for moral judgment of human acts.
Third, adherence to this thesis is merely a disguise for what is
undoubtedly only one particular ideology. Thus, this argument has
led some of its adherents to believe in the development of human
freedom as an existential role8 or in the progress toward human
freedom and the classless society as essential realities of our time. 2
To believe that human freedom and the classless society, or even
progress toward these ends, are realities of our time is certainly too
fanciful to accept. Even apart from the incredibility of this account
of contemporary reality, the theoretical point remains that such a
characterization is merely a disguise for a preferred ideology, not a
fusion of the realms of is and ought.
III. CONCLUSION
The interpretations of the is-ought relationship have been various.
The pure theory of law takes the epistemological position that the two
are dichotomous. The purposive theory of law posits that the two
merge in purposive activity, such as law, so that the is of the activity
cannot be understood without the ought of it. Certain phenomenologi-
80. Friedmann states:
It is only to the extent that legislators and courts respond to the new relation-
ships - which they do with much discrimination - that legal values are ad-
justed to new social facts. As one of many examples, we might cite the way
in which the law takes note of the cohabitation of a man and a woman who are
not legally married. For certain purposes, but not for others, this relationship
may be recognized as legally relevant. Thus, during World War II, the military
authority in Britain regarded a de facto wife as entitled to dependents allow-
ances to the same extent as a properly married wife. But for most other pur-
poses, e.g., rights of succession, legitimacy of children, etc., the legal distinction
between marriage and de facto relationships remained unchanged. The legal
order, i.e., the system of legal values, responds - sometimes quickly, sometimes
haltingly, and sometimes not at all - to new phenomena of society, but this
does not mean the fusion of fact and value.
Friedmann, supra note 74, at 362.
81. For a list of works by one adherent, Poulantzas, see note 75 and accom-
panying text supra.
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cal theories maintain that the two are fused together because of the
very ontological structure of human existence. This author has no
quarrel with a universal explanation of the legal phenomenon as de-
sired by the pure theory, or with a recognition of the input of values
in law as desired by the purposive theory, or with the argument made
by certain phenomenologists for human freedom through the use of
philosophic, eidetic, and transcentental reductions. Nevertheless, it is
submitted that none of those theories succeeds in either the fission or
fusion of is-ought. Although the objectives of these theories could
perhaps be achieved without taking such epistemological positions, the
respective positions taken concerning is-ought seem untenable.
Thus, the principles of logic stated at the beginning of this article
remain intact when used to comprehend the nature of the legal
phenomenon. It is clear that the connection between the is of the law
and the ought of the law is not that of logic. While the two realms
may be related in some manner, they remain conceptually distinct. The
effort to achieve some semblance of relationship between the law and
the values of its ethos has been one constant of mankind's jurispru-
dential thought, as well as an essence of much of its political history.
Varied notions have been used in juristic theory in attempting to define
this relationship. 3 Achieving the relationship between the two realms
requires a value judgment which cannot be escaped by making a
logical deduction. If is (facts) and ought (values) were not distinct,
one could arrive at values by simply deducing them from facts, as in
a mere game of logic. Instead, the responsibility for making value
judgments remains, in the final analysis, with those who make them.
83. For examples of the different concepts used throughout history to define
the relationship between the law and the value of its ethos, see A. BASHAM, THE
WONDER THAT WAS INDIA 30-31, 112-13 (1954) (virtue); CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA
DE LEGIBUS (C. Keys transl. 1952) (right reason); E. CAHN, THE SENSE OF
INJUSTICE 1-2 (1949) (the sense of injustice) ; M. EDEL & A. EDEL, ANTHROPOLOGY
AND ETHICS 19-33 (rev. ed. 1968) (anthropology); FULLER, MORALITY OF LAW,
rupra note 10, at 5-6 (inner morality of law) ; Aristotle, Politica, in 10 THE WORKS
OF ARISTOTLE 1287a (W.D. Ross ed. 1961) (nature); Brown, Huntsmen, What
Quarry?, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY, A SYMPOSIUM 177, 179-85 (S. Hook ed. 1964)
(relation of moral truths and general facts); Chroust, Natural Law and Legal
Positivism, 13 OHIO ST. L.J. 178, 186 (1952) (relativity of rights and restraints);
Dabin, General Theory of Law, in THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES OF LASx, RADBRUCH,
AND DABIN 332-36, 416-31 (K. Wilk transl. 1950) (morals) ; D'Entreves, The Case
for Natural Law Re-examined, 1 NATURAL L.F. 5, 28-49 (1956) (deontology);
Selznick, Sociology and Natural Law, 6 NATURAL L.F. 84, 99-108 (1961) (sociology) ;
Siches, Human Life, Society, and Law: Fundamentals of the Philosophy of the Law,
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